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The 5.2L FPC program contributed to delaying the 5.0 Eco Boost program, but this V8 Twin-Turbo program is now on track again, and will make it’s debut in the next GT5 F-150 Raptor, and could possibly become a second-motor option for the 2017 model year Raptor” We are also told that the new 10-speed automatic transmission that will be found in the 2016 3.5L V6 Eco Boost Raptor will be the same transmission utilized in the V8 Raptor, whether it goes on sale as a 2017 model year, or 2018.
“The Raptor will ultimately be a two-motor truck – that was the plan all along – much like you have the option for the Eco Boost V6 or 5.0 V8 in other F-150 models.
The statute mandates that Section 3(a) of the Registration Act information be disclosed to counties and other entities, such as institutions of higher learning, public school boards, child care facilities, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, social service agencies providing services to minors, and volunteer organizations providing services to minors. After reviewing the language of the Registration Act and its legislative history, the Court concluded that the legislature intended to protect the public in two ways: (1) by providing crucial information to law enforcement officials who monitor the movements of sex offenders; and (2) by disseminating the information to the public. The Court rejected this argument, stating: “[a]lthough the public availability of the website information may have a lasting and painful impact on sex offenders, these consequences flow not from the statutory registration and notification scheme but from the fact of conviction, which is already a matter of public record.” Additionally, Minnis argued: (1) a “strict scrutiny” First Amendment analysis should be applied because the disclosure requirements against sex offenders are “content-based laws” (i.e., laws applicable to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message conveyed), and are presumptively unconstitutional unless a restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest (which Minnis claimed did not occur); and (2) the Registration Act and Notification Law “chills substantially more speech than is necessary to further the governmental interest.” The Court rejected these arguments, engaged in a comparative analysis, adopted an “intermediate scrutiny” constitutional standard, and concluded that: (1) Illinois sex offender laws are “content-neutral,” (i.e., they “impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed”); and (2) the remedy of sex offender disclosures laws enacted by the legislature “advances the substantial governmental interest of protecting sex offenses against children and protecting the public from the dangers against recidivist sex offenders,” outweighing any “chilling effect.” Minnis also argued that, in addition to the unfavorable treatment of juveniles as sex offenders, the disclosure obligation applied to “too many people” and the courts should undertake an “individualized risk assessment” of each offender as part of its “independent duty” to review these policy issues.
Information regarding juvenile sex offenders is limited to those persons whose “safety may be compromised” by the offender and to senior school personnel; the registration information must also be kept separate from other school records. The Illinois Supreme Court’s Analysis The Minnis Court compared the free speech rights of sex offenders under the First Amendment to the offenders’ Internet disclosure obligations. harming not only [individuals,] but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas,” especially when criminal sanctions are imposed. Moreover, Illinois’ sex offender laws are consistent with those of other states. In rejecting the defendant’s characterization that Illinois’ sex offenders’ registration requirement was “poor policy,” the Court emphasized that its “task” was to decide whether the legislature violated the Constitution and that on “questions of policy,” the “legislature is in a better position than the judiciary to gather and evaluate data bearing on complex problems.” Moreover, the Illinois sex offender laws were somewhat narrowly-tailored because: juveniles can petition to have their registration terminated after two years; school access to a juvenile sex offender’s registration is limited to more senior school personnel; and “despite its plainly legitimate sweep,” the Internet disclosure provision does not mandate disclosure of individuals with whom the sex offender interacts. A site publicly available on the Internet poses no threat to children—after all, every police officer in the world can see it.” The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed.
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In July 2015, the circuit court granted Minnis’ motion to dismiss the indictment; specifically ruling that the entire Registration Act’s Internet disclosure requirement was unconstitutional on its “face” and “as applied” to Minnis, and it was “based solely on the first amendment.” If Minnis “knowingly or wilfully” provided “false” information under the Registration Act (including incomplete information regarding his Facebook account), he can be found guilty of a Class 3 felony, which carries a sentence of up to five years imprisonment. Registration Act and Notification Law “The Registration Act and the Notification Law ‘operate in tandem, providing a comprehensive scheme for the registration of Illinois sex offenders and the dissemination of information about these offenders to the public.’” all e-mail addresses, instant messaging identities, chat room identities, and other Internet communications identities that the sex offender uses or plans to use, all Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) registered or used by the sex offender, all blogs and other Internet sites maintained by the sex offender or to which the sex offender has uploaded any content or posted any messages or information.
According to the Illinois Supreme Court, the First Amendment right to freedom of speech includes the right to publish writings anonymously, as a “‘shield from tyranny of the majority’” and “‘retaliation’” from “‘an intolerant society.’” As such, the “threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech . According to the Court, “‘any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than could from any soapbox’” and “‘[t]hrough the use of Web pages . Finally, the Minnis Court distinguished three federal court cases that invalidated state sex offender notification statutes, one which stated that “[b]logs frequently, and perhaps mostly, involve discussion of matters of public concern. The Court stated that “these courts failed to recognize the breath necessary to protect the public” or “to engage in the comparative analysis of whether the chilling effect was substantially broader than that required by the statutory purpose.” V.
Blogs are by their nature open to the public and pose no threat to children . Conclusion The Minnis case has significant legal implications for the First Amendment, sex offenders, the Internet, the Illinois courts, and the Illinois criminal justice system.
Third, since the Minnis Court clearly left future modifications of sex offender laws to the legislature, and since the registration disclosure and notification requirements as a “sex offender” are significant and have a stigma attached to them, the Illinois General Assembly may want to revisit the scope of the Registration Act and Notification Law (e.g., a ten-year reporting requirement and other broad categories of disclosures), and particularly, the effect of the disclosures and notification requirements on juveniles.
Fourth, because of the stigma of being a sex offender, as recognized by the Minnis Court, prosecutors must continue to engage in thorough investigations of sex crimes cases, and they must be particularly careful when deciding whether to charge, or to seek indictments of, juveniles and adults for sex crimes.